We respond to the call for a more balanced view of agency (Tourish, 2014: 88) by presenting an account of the forced resignation of Jean-Marie Messier as CEO of the major French company, Vivendi Universal, in 2002. Messier's ousting arose from a struggle for board control involving an exercise of power that was influenced strongly by kinship relationships, interlocking directorships, and business alliances; and by the interplay between a nouveau riche (Messier), an influential old guard shareholder family (the Bronfmans), and an established elite (of prominent representatives of French business. Collusion between the French business establishment and the Bronfman family created a coalition of interest and a locus of control that managerial and agency theories explain inadequately. We highlight the potential for a reading of class relationships in terms of structuration to foster better understanding of the complexities involved when the board of a major corporation decides to support, or withdraw support for, their CEO. We highlight several context-specific structures and mechanisms that were influential in determining corporate control and CEO agency.
Introduction
We are motivated by Tourish (2014) to develop a more expansive view of agency. We do so in a context in which agency is defined as 'the capacity [of leaders] to take action' (Tourish, 2014: 80) . We confess to having tended, in the past, to attribute excessive agency to the Chief Executive Officer [CEO] of major corporations. Tourish's (2014) analysis has prompted us to rethink. We also answer the call of Collinson (2014) to mitigate the deep-seated tendency in leadership studies to rely on dichotomous thinking, where 'leaders' personas and practices have tended to be privileged and psychological perspectives and positivist methodologies predominate' (p. 39).
We highlight the merit of re-thinking our understanding of leadership dynamics, and how a CEO's agency can be mitigated by structural factors to form new locations of power. Our study offers implicit critique of the stream of research in leadership that attributes excessive agency to the CEO. This is particularly evident in the dominant leadership theory of the past three decades, that of transformational leadership (see van Knippenberg and Sitkin, 2013 , for extended analysis and critique). As such, this paper could be associated with the critical leadership studies paradigm. The approach to agency we advocate does not have a dichotomizing impulse. Rather, we use dialectics between agency and structures to emphasise the role of other organizational actors (such as members of the board of directors and their networked associates). While exercising their agency, these other organizational actors create social structures which have the capacity to reduce CEO agency.
In this paper we provide an encompassing view of agency -one that does not conceive agency as absolute, formal, hierarchical and capable of quantitative determination. Rather, we view agency as being influenced by what Giddens (1976) calls 'the duality of structure.' We locate our study, generally, in the non-economics (rather than economics) paradigm of agency theory (Shapiro, 2005) . We concentrate more on agency theory's political science paradigm (addressing matters of delegation of power and authority) and the sociology paradigm (analyzing how relationships affect control in complex systems). In terms of the 'streams' of agency theory literature identified by Shapiro (2005: 269-70) , our focus is applied more to examinations of 'corporate governance and control' than to matters of 'incentive alignment … [and] compensation policies' or to 'agency problems, agency costs and agency efficacy. ' We use the lens of a case study of the quest for board control of a large French company, Vivendi Universal [VU] . Our focus is on the circumstances that led VU's board of directors to replace Jean-Marie Messier as CEO and Chair in 2002. We aim to provide a 'more balanced view of agency which takes a fuller account of the agency of other actors' (Tourish, 2014: 88) by having regard for their empowerment through particular social structures.
We reveal how the interplay of kinship bonds, interlocking directorships, business alliances and related structures and mechanisms influenced relationships between VU's CEO and its [and his systematic] "Americanization" [of] both his French company and, in the process, his role as CEO. ' We draw attention to the limited capacity of agency theory to explain corporate governance behavior and to reflect the wider institutional contexts that affect organizations (Christopher, 2010: 683) . The VU case outlines events that do not accord with the agency theory view 'that the board of directors is an information system that enables the stockholders within large corporations to monitor the opportunism of top executives' (Eisenhardt, 1989: 59) .
Nor does the VU case reinforce the assumption of managerial theory 'that boards of directors universally rubber stamp decisions by top management' (Palmer et al., 1995: 487) . We argue that managerialist and agency theories provide inadequate explanations of how agency was exercised in VU. Additionally, we reveal how social structures are constituted by human agency and, at the same time. are the very medium of this constitution. We draw attention to the capacity for agency theory to promote illusions about market sovereignty, democratic capitalism, and the answerability of corporations to their owners (Rowlinson et al., 2006 ). The VU case shows how conventional thinking regarding the separation of ownership and management in a large corporation can cloud understanding of the effective source and nature of corporate agency.
The leadership of companies such as VU is influenced by a multiplicity of structures and mechanisms. Thus, multi-theoretical explanations of leader behavior are likely to be encompassing and insightful. Accordingly, we investigate the extent to which agency theory and managerial theory explain why Messier was replaced as CEO. In particular, we explore whether the board of directors was effective in monitoring Messier (agency theory) or whether Messier was able to manage differences between directors to increase his power and control (managerial theory). Superficially at least, the removal of Messier seems attributable to the action of the board, thereby lending credence to an agency theory explanation. However, we argue that Messier was removed for less apparent reasons: the entrenched modus operandi of the French business establishment; the coalescing actions of a business elite; and the selfinterest of a long established shareholder family. We contend that the structure of interpersonal relations, group dynamics and political intrigue between several directors, shareholders and other influential players, provides a strong plausible explanation for Messier's removal and for the limits of his agency. Such structures and behaviors are treated as a 'black box' by agency theory (Tricker, 2012) .
We contribute to understanding leaders by presenting a broader view of agency. We do so in the context of a decision by a board of directors to support, or not support, an incumbent CEO. We show how the power of a CEO is not totally constrained, as functionalists contend.
Furthermore, we reveal it is not absolute, as managerialists contend. We argue that the power of a CEO is relative, and that it can be mitigated. We show how the interests of an established elite and an 'old guard' can coalesce through kinship relations, interlocking directorships, and networks of influence. They create social structures that effect corporate control. Our narrative reveals how matters of national pride, personal prestige and social class can influence critical decisions regarding corporate leadership. We draw attention to a setting in which economic capital was not the only factor determining corporate control − social, cultural and symbolic capital were key elements too.
Our unfolding narrative introduces a cast that includes members of an 'old boy' network of former students of elite French schools, the Grand Écoles, and members of the elite grands corps of the French civil service. They were strongly patriotic businesspersons and politicians with an overriding commitment to maintain French culture, traditions and its 'insider model' of capitalism (Whittington and Mayer, 2000) . Many of the 'old boys' were from the finance and banking industries. They were employed in four major networks of influence (centred on the insurance company AXA, and the banks BNP, Credit Lyonnaise and Société Générale). Other major players in our narrative are representatives of North American capital (the Bronfmans).
Our central character, Messier (born in 1956) , was an 'old boy' of a prominent Grand École.
As a graduate of the prestigious École nationale d'administration [ENA], Messier was a member
of an elite in France 1 − one that was considered to be the 'keeper of the flame' of French capitalism. He had served in the elite grands corps of the French civil service and had strong links with the French finance industry. He shared a middle class background 2 with some major influential establishment figures in France. Nonetheless, he was regarded widely by the French business and political establishment as a nouveau riche or parvenu (that is, as a relative newcomer to a socioeconomic class). The older generation of leaders of the French establishment, such as Bébéar (born in 1935, Chair of AXA, and reputed to be the 'godfather' of French business) and Fourtou (born in 1939) , regarded Messier as an upstart who had come 'too far too soon' (Ward, 2002: 210) .
The forced resignation of Messier in 2002 and the ensuing re-configuration of VU were controlled indirectly by a group of individuals who were not members of VU's board of directors. Their shareholdings were below widely advocated proprietary cut-off points that are claimed to indicate corporate agency or control (variously 20%, 10%, and 5%). We contend that control of VU was won because social structures and mechanisms allowed the established elite in France to collude with an influential 'old guard' family (the Bronfmans) and to create a locus of control that managerialism and agency theory each struggle to identify and explain.
Messier's removal as CEO represented the exercise of power 'to achieve one's subjective interests over others' subjective interests' and to 'keep certain interests from getting on the agenda' (Ron, 2008: 272; see also Lukes, 2005 ).
We do not provide a comprehensive operational micro-analysis of the inner sanctum of corporate power and leadership. Rather, we analyse the dynamic interrelationship between structures and the agency of elite groups in their struggle for corporate control. We highlight the relationships between relevant social players and reveal how power and influence were exercised in the context of existing social structures.
The following section outlines the facilitative analytical framework we use to elaborate on relevant aspects of managerialist and agency theories. We then outline our research method, before explaining the general business climate in which VU operated, and the broad circumstances of the control crisis at VU. Thereafter, we introduce the key players involved in the quest for control of VU (nouveau riche, old guard, and an established elite including members of the Institut Montaigne and Club Entreprises et Cités). We then explore the struggle for control by exposing some destabilizing factors that are critical in understanding the exercise of power. In the final section we enter conclusions.
An analytical framework of corporate agency
In this section we explore how agency arises, and how it can be empowered or limited. We assume readers are familiar with agency theory and its breadth of interpretation and application. Those wanting a fuller appreciation of agency theory should refer to the assessment and review provided by Eisenhardt (1989) , and the overview provided by Shapiro (2005) .
The separation of ownership and control and the rise of agency
Control or agency arises through the power to select board members; and thereby, to dictate corporate policy. Such a power is attributed to shareholders by agency theory. Managerialism attributes control to the CEO, in a context of 'managerial capitalism'.
Managerial capitalism was born in the 1920s according to Chabrak (2011) and Davis (2009) .
Big corporations began to be run by professional managers. They were less constrained by shareholders who increasingly had dispersed shareholdings. When US bankers largely withdrew from owning large corporations, and members of the general public flooded into the stock market during the 1920s, ownership became increasingly dispersed (Berle and Means ([1932] 1982). Ownership became centrifugal with thousands of anonymous, powerless shareholders each owning no more than a tiny fraction of a company's shares. Meanwhile, corporate control became centripetal, with the accession to power of the 'organization man' (Dahrendorf, 1972) .
Managerialism claims that as a consequence of managerial capitalism, control could no longer be exercised by an old guard of founding families, but was exercised by managerial elites (Galbraith, 1989) . Mace (1971) (Galbraith, 1989) and as a legal fiction (Clarke, 2007) . Such a shift has been said to eliminate the former capitalist class by promoting a sort of 'capitalism without capitalists' (Dahrendorf, 1972) .
For Berle and Means ([1932] 1982) , the corporation slipped imperceptibly and inevitably under management control once a cohesive ownership interest with at least a minimum specified proportion of the issued shares disappeared. The specified proprietary control cut-off point of 20% used in Berle and Means' seminal study in 1932 of the 200 largest US companies has been replaced in more recent research by a 10% required minimum. However, this revised minimum cut-off point is contestable too: it does not discern some different modes of corporate control that are difficult to categorize (Zeitlin, 1974 (Zeitlin, : 1090 . Thus, any conclusion that control shifts to managers when share ownership falls below a specified minimum percentage is, in our view, questionable.
We contend that the claim that agency in modern corporations has shifted from personal property ownership by wealthy families and business dynasties, to business bureaucracies, is overly simplistic. Our analysis in the case of VU takes account of social structures and mechanisms, and their effect on CEO agency. The structures we examine were created by the pattern of shareholdings and their evolution; the relationships between VU and other corporations and institutions; and the forms of personal union or interlocking relationship between corporate officers, directors, and principal shareholding families.
Duality of structure: social structures and the agency of corporate elites
We use Giddens' (1976) structuration theory to explain the relationship between individual actions and social structures. Our readings of Zeitlin (1974) and Palmer and Barber (2001) are informed by Giddens' (1976: 121) ideas of duality of structure: that is, that 'social structures are constituted by human agency, and yet at the same time are the very medium of this constitution' (Giddens, 1976: 121) .
According to Palmer and Barber (2001) , the position of corporate elites is prescribed institutionally. Corporate elites attain power in a multidimensional social class structure as a consequence of their ownership of the means of production, the social status into which they are born, the educational credentials they attain, and their capacity to network socially with other elites. The desire of self-made corporate leaders to increase their wealth and social status was a strong motivator for the wave of mergers and acquisitions in the 1960s in the USA (Palmer and Barber, 2001 ). To pursue active corporate acquisition strategies successfully, and to exercise their agency fully, leaders needed to overcome social structures that resulted from the resistance (agency) of other social players (an old guard and an established elite).
The old guard is composed of owning families. They are usually disinclined to engage in diversifying acquisitions (e.g., of the type pursued by VU) because of the threat to their current business interests (Palmer and Barber, 2001 ). The established elite is an inner group that defends the existing social and economic order. It comprises individuals who are embedded in social networks: they attend exclusive schools, frequent exclusive organizations and social clubs, and serve on interlocking boards of directors. They do not necessarily come from families of high status (Palmer and Barber, 2001 ).
Hence, for Palmer and Barber (2001) , CEO agency is possible only if it is freed from social structures that result from the exercise of agency by other social actors. We contend that an individual's social actions and agency are the synthesis of structures and agency. Thus, agency is not simply a function of an individual's expression of will. Furthermore, it is not constrained by the incommensurable forces of social structures. Rather, agency is influenced by structures.
These structures are not (metaphorical) 'steel frames,' but are socially constructed. They are produced, maintained and adapted through the exercise of agency by social actors. Zeitlin (1974) offers good account of how the agency of corporate elites creates structures and mechanisms that limit CEO agency. These elites take advantage of interlocking directorships, and other networks, to do so. He argues that the web of kinship relations that unites apparently unrelated individuals forming boards of directors, helps to determine corporate agency and control. He adds that central to developing an understanding of such control is the need to appreciate the connections between directors and banks; and whether a family sphere of influence exists through various personal and business connections, complicated business structures, and other 'eleemosynary [charitable] arrangements' (Zeitlin, 1974 (Zeitlin, : 1098 . Consistent with this view, a family-dominated business dynasty can be more resilient than managerialism would suggest. It can exercise control at lower (percentage) levels of proprietary ownership by virtue of strong kinship networks. Thus, a small proportion of shares in the hands of an influential family can carry different control potential than if held by a single individual with no other major resources and supporting institutions (Zeitlin, 1974 (Zeitlin, : 1098 . In this vein, La Porta et al. (1999: 502) provide evidence that 'families often have control rights over firms significantly in excess of their cash flow rights.' Thus, strong family relationships should be viewed as powerful forms of capital, and as having the potential to be critical influences in the quest for control of a company (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992) .
Drawing on Zeitlin (1974) , we argue that some influential social actors (the old guard and the business elite), in their exercise of agency, create structural limitations on CEO agency.
Method
We embed our study of the leadership change at VU in a deeper study of preceding events. We rely on a wide array of publicly available information, including VU's published annual (and other publicly available) reports, and press releases issued by VU and the French Capital Markets Authority (Autorité des marchés financiers). From these sources we compiled financial and corporate governance data (e.g., VU's capital structure from 2000 to 2004; and the composition of VU's board of directors before and after the resignation of Messier). We used a cartographic approach, similar to that of Chabrak (2012, Table 3) , to understand the networks of influence in French capitalism.
Our qualitative research methods (including document analysis procedures) follow the principles outlined by Miles and Huberman (1994) : that is, in respect of data reduction, data display, and conclusion drawing and verification. Our method involved observing data related to the phenomenon at issue (the resignation of Messier); developing conjectures to explain that phenomenon (analytical framework); and then collecting data to confirm or refute them (Blaikie, 2007) . The first and third authors, as residents of Paris, were first-hand observers of the leadership control crisis at VU. They worked together, independently of the second author, to form initial assessments. These were moderated subsequently by the second author, until a consensus view was reached.
Secondary data were accessed from a variety of conventional bibliographic sources, including scholarly journals (some accessed using Google Scholar), Internet websites (e.g., of NYSE Euronext), and French and American newspapers and periodicals (e.g., le Monde, Time, Vanity Fair, and New York Times) . We draw contextualizing information from a widely cited biography of Messier by Orange and Johnson (2004) and from a case study of the (so-called) 'rescue' of VU (Rebiere 2004) . Secondary data were analysed concurrently with primary data to corroborate the factual content of statements derived from document analysis. Almost all data sources were read separately by at least two authors. This study's interpretive nature renders it prudent for readers to be mindful that the social situation documented is complex and fraught with a 'plurality of plausible explanations' (Ron, 2008: 291) . Thus, we make no claim that the explanations offered are necessarily better than any other. We rely on a conception of objectivity that has been endorsed widely in the social sciences. We recognize that there are no pure facts in social research. Nonetheless, our findings appear to be consistent with our concepts and theorising. Readers should be mindful that knowledge is constructed socially, that the views we present of the social world are a matter of intersubjective agreement; and knowledge is an interpretation which is subject to social controls, criticism by peers, and social negotiation (Blaikie, 2007) . Thus, if objectivity is construed as a critically achieved consensus of the scientific community, then our results should be considered tentative and open to revision.
The control crisis at Vivendi Universal
Throughout the 1990s, media conglomerates such as VU engaged in cross-industry mergers, acquisitions and strategic alliances to obtain stronger competitive positions. Their actions were facilitated by government deregulation of the telecommunications industry, digitalization in telecommunications, and competition in satellite, cable, analog and digital terrestrial diffusion.
By 2000, the media market in the US and Europe had become dominated by large, integrated, diversified companies (Time Warner, Disney-ABC, Viacom-CBS, News Corp, Sony and Bertelsmann). These companies served diverse audiences through multiple distribution channels and multiple technologies. They acquired complementary assets and pursued vertical integration. They acquired content-production capacity, distribution capacity, and the right to market consumer electronic devices. In 2000, the mergers of Vivendi with Universal (to form VU), and AOL with Time Warner (to form AOL Time Warner [AOLTW]) were prominent examples of global multimedia convergence strategies. However, the VU and AOLTW mergers were both deemed to be failures (Bodie, 2006: 975) . To understand the main reasons for the failure of the VU merger, and whether the strategic thinking underlying it was a valid reason for Messier's removal, it is important to first explore how VU developed and expanded. Messier accelerated CGE's diversification by making significant investments in mobile telephony and new media technologies. Major events in the history of VU are summarized in Table 1 .
Insert Table 1 Messier's leadership riled the French establishment: it perceived him to be an ambitious, garrulous showman who courted celebrity status (Clark, 2004) . For his part, Messier alleges 'prominent members of the French business establishment' conspired against him (Clark, 2004 ). Messier did not endear himself to many ordinary French people. He confronted French pride and nationalism. He dismissed 'French cultural exception', embraced English as the official language of VU, and advocated the adoption of American business culture (see Dickerson, 2003 Dickerson, : 1046 .
By 2002, VU had sustained severe financial losses. The 'halo effect' described by Rosenzweig (2007) was at play. VU's good performance in prior years was attributed to its allegedly visionary and charismatic CEO. Evaluation of bad performance was biased in a similar fashion. Generally, observers formed an opposite conclusion -the same CEO now viewed as arrogant. The halo effect seems to have lingered, at least partially, because although Messier was blamed for the bad performance, the general strategic direction he set for the company was not implicated by his critics in their blame. Messier's forced resignation as CEO on June 30, 2002 raises many issues regarding corporate agency and control. We contend his resignation was not prompted by strategic mistakes on his part, or by any compelling force of unacceptable accounting performance measures. Rather, we contend it was the consequence of social structures and mechanisms involving kinship relationships, interlocking directorships, and business alliances that resulted from the exercise of agency by corporate elites. In explaining our contention, we focus on a nouveau riche (Messier), an old guard influential shareholder family (Bronfmans), and an established elite (influential directors). 5
Messier's removal as CEO is analyzed in the context of the long tradition of French companies of sharing the services of their CEOs reciprocally through interlocking board memberships. In 1999, 50% of French corporations were involved in reciprocal interlocking directorships (Yeo et al., 2003) . Persons appointed to two, three, or more corporate boards were part of an inner-circle of elite persons who were more likely to have attended the 'right' schools, belonged to the 'right' clubs, and be from the 'right' social background. In 1995, 23 elite persons held 214 board directorships in France and exerted strong control over companies composing the CAC 40 (Kadushin, 1995: 203) .
We identify four networks of influence among the French directors. These centered on the insurance company AXA (founded by Bébéar) and three large banks, as follows:
• AXA network: including Bébéar, Breton (Thomson), Fourtou (Aventis), Lachman (Schneider), François-Poncet (BNP Paribas).
• BNP network: including Pébereau, Bébéar, (AXA), Beffa (Saint-Gobain), Friedman (UAP), Messier (VU), Owen-Jones (L'Oréal).
• Société Générale network: including Bouton, Tchuruk (Alcatel), Messier (Vivendi Universal), Desmarest (TotalFina-Elf), Viénot.
• Crédit Lyonnais network: including Lagardère (Lagardère), Bouygues (Bouygues).
It is common practice for links between elite educational institutions and major financial and industrial companies to be exploited to protect French corporations from hostile attacks by institutional investors (Whittington and Mayer, 2000) . The French elite, from the prestigious Grandes Écoles and les corps de l'Etat, benefited from government-supported institutional arrangements that encouraged cross-shareholdings and interlocking board directorships (Whittington and Mayer, 2000) . However, from about the end of the 1990s, the pressure exerted by institutional investors diluted the level of cross-shareholdings (Morin, 2009 ).
Key Players

Nouveau riche and old guard
Messier was born into a family of modest status in Grenoble in 1956, the son of a chartered accountant and the grandson of a chauffeur (Orange and Johnson, 2004 In 2000, the creation of VU with a share market capitalization of €100 billion heralded the arrival on the VU share register of a very wealthy and influential family, the Bronfmans. They had prospered largely because of the business acumen of Samuel Bronfman (1889 Bronfman ( -1971 (Rebiere, 2004) .
The Control of VU: Beyond three apparent destabilizing factors
The first apparent destabilizing factor after VU's merger with Seagram was its announcement of accounting losses of €13. The role that the published accounting results played in influencing the board's decision is consistent with the 'ammunition machine' metaphor proposed by Burchell et al. (1980) : that is, accounting information was used to support a political process 'by which and through which interested parties [promoted] their own particular interests ' (p.15) . The organizational setting at VU conformed to many of the characteristics Burchell et al. (1980) suggest coincide with the use of accounting in such a role: there was a conflict over basic orientations and the means to achieve ends; and there were coalitions of interest.
A second alleged destabilizing factor was that rumors and short selling A third misleading destabilizing factor was that, from the first half of 2002, the board of directors (see Table 2 ) announced its concern about the failure of VU to realize the expected synergies of its convergence with Seagram.
Insert Table 2 about here
The board declared that it had negotiated additional financial facilities from banks on June 28. Those negotiations were made easier because Société Générale and BNP Paribas were committed heavily to VU; and because two directors of VU were honorary presidents of these banks (Thomas at BNP Paribas; Viénot at Société Générale). However, and importantly, the financial facilitation VU received was made on one condition: that Messier should resign. 12 This pressuring tactic was applied by the French business elite. They campaigned to persuade the VU board that it would never get operational control of American assets; and that those assets should be sold to American interests to preserve Vivendi Environnement (that is, CGE). 13 
Messier's agency and the agency of an established elite and old guard: duality of structure
Fourtou's appointment as CEO was the culmination of a putsch orchestrated by the Bronfman family and Bébéar. This was facilitated by the kinship of apparently unrelated directors. As shown in Table 3 , VU's board of directors was dominated by members of the Club Entreprises et Cités, a conservative business lobby group. The agency of the Bronfman family and Bébéar imposed structural limitations on Messier exercising his agency fully.
Insert Table 3 about here
The influence of the Bronfman family cannot be appreciated fully if we use the managerialist criterion of 10% of share ownership as the indicator of control. It would be better to establish their control by using Burch's (1972) criteria: family members were affluent and held 4% to 5% or more of the voting shares; and family members were on the board of directors over an extended period of time (see Table 4 ).
Insert Table 4 about here However, regardless of their small proportion of VU's shares, we argue that the Bronfman family's agency became a decisive factor in creating structural limitations on Messier's agency and his capacity to effect VU policies and its reconfiguration. This is particularly the case when their interests and actions coalesced with those of Bébéar and his factional allies on the board.
Although VU's directors were apparently unrelated individuals, in reality they were connected by close kinship relations. This empowered their agency and their capacity to influence Messier.
In accord with the explanation given by Zeitlin (1974; , VU directors were either from (or associated with) large banks and insurance companies. Generally, in France, large banks and insurance companies hold stakes in large corporations and are represented on boards of directors. Those boards also contain many influential individuals and families as principal shareholders. Thus, they often contain a small circle of persons with the capacity to exert concentrated power because of their community of interests.
In 2001, under Messier's leadership, there were 19 directors. The 12 French directors included some very influential personalities in the French business world (see Table 2 ). The large VU board made it easier for Messier to manage any antagonism and reinforce his control.
At this time, Messier was at the heart of a network of 39 directors and some loosely coupled sub-networks (Guieu and Meschi, 2008) . However, after his resignation in 2002, the only significant network that remained was composed of Pébereau, Fourtou, Breton, Roger, Bébéar, Roulet, Poncet, Friedmann, Calvet and Lachmann (Guieu and Meschi, 2008) (Kadushin, 1995; Campbell 2014) .
Two other factors were critical in defining friendships in the inner group: political tendencies, and class solidarity (Kadushin, 1995) . Messier's replacement, Fourtou, had been a close friend of Bébéar for more than 30 years. 15 Fourtou and Bébéar were born and raised in who decided that urgent intervention was needed …' (Ward, 2002: 210) .
Although Messier had managed cultural differences between the North American and protect the company's French interests (Rebiere, 2004 ).
Messier's numerous enemies were very concerned about his insensitivity to Gallic pride and culture. His declaration that English should be VU's official language and his advocacy of American business culture for VU, were highly inflammatory (Ward, 2002: 209) . His view that this 'French cultural exception' was outdated was at odds with the deep rooting of this principle in French psyche. It dismayed many French people, including many in the French entertainment industry, and French President Jacques Chirac (Coatney, 2002; Ward, 2002: 209 
Conclusions
This paper can be located in that part of the leadership literature which contends that corporate power and agency is not concentrated absolutely in the hands of leaders, but is dispersed widely, and can be marshalled by non-leaders and leaders (Tourish, 2014, p.80) . As such, an implicit message is that we should be less inclined to view leaders as at the "centre of more or less solid hierarchies and stable networks", but instead regard their agency as ephemeral, and fashioned by "fluid social structures" and "particular social, organisational and temporal contexts" (Tourish, 2014, pp. 79-80) . We alluded in the opening of our paper to the leader-centric accounts of agency that are a key feature of transformational leadership theories. In even more blatant form, such approaches feed into populist narratives that seek to identify 'the top performing CEOs' in any given year, and which assume a direct causal connection between CEO intentions and organizational performance (e.g., Ignatius, 2014) . Our paper challenges such perspectives. In the VU case, the actions of the old guard and established elite highlight the potential to regard non-leaders "as knowledgeable and proactive agents with multiple prospects for action and deep vestiges of power at their disposal" (Tourish, 2014, p.88 ).
Messier's removal as CEO of VU reveals how agency can be constrained by social structures and a larger political environment. These constraints can severely disrupt leaders' ability to exercise power, and retain their post. 22 The VU case provides a more balanced view of agencyone that is consistent with Giddens' (1976) 'duality of structure' explanation. We reveal the importance of social structures and mechanisms, such as networks of influence (family, friends, and access to capital), appeals to patriotism, and inflamed prejudices (e.g., against a nouveau riche), that result from the exercise of agency by other influential social actors. We draw attention to the limitations of quantitatively deterministic 'rules of thumb' to indicate the locus of effective agency. We highlight the potential for leader agency to be mediated by 'national cultural identity' and entrenched national 'modes of doing business.'
Understanding the forces that influenced the resignation of Messier provides insight to features of corporate agency that have been under-researched. The interests of the old guard
Bronfman family coincided with those of the established elite. This commonality of interests shifted the locus of control to the wealthy Bronfman family (despite it owning less than 5% of the voting share capital) and the Bébéar clan (despite most of its members not being board directors). Thus, the emerging picture is of two groups of capitalists whose interests were mutually dependent and intertwined. They exercised power to shape social and political conditions in a way that suited them. Bronfmans wanted to protect the century-long dynasty built by Samuel Bronfman. Once, they colluded, the resulting structures and mechanisms 'set in motion … worked quickly' to oust Messier (Ward, 2002: 212) .
Understanding of the control struggle at VU should not overlook the importance of the exploitation of class relationships. The VU case draws attention to circumstances in which economic capital is not the sole determinant of the winners of power struggles. Other forms of capital (such as social capital) were crucial in ceding control of VU to persons who did not hold a major interest in the group capital or who were not involved in VU's governance. We should recognize too that financial accounts and reports had diminished revelatory potential. They did not enable potential or existing shareholders, customers or employees to learn much about the tussle for control of the company. As a consequence, many shareholders with large holdings were at an information and power disadvantage -unless, like many of the leading characters in the preceding narrative, they were able to take advantage of 'the right connections.'
In terms of leadership theory and pedagogy, the VU case stresses that leaders are often embedded in, or subject to, dense networks of influence that either inhibit or enhance their agency and capacity for action. This important feature of leadership contexts is often underplayed in theorizing about, and in teaching, leadership. It is important to have regard for the view that individual actions of leaders arise from a synthesis of social structures and agency. Source: annual reports accessible at http://www.amf-france.org/
